But this view is wrong. The current tax reform legislation in both the House version (TRA17H) and Senate version (TRA17S) clearly relies on BEPS principles and in particular on the single tax principle. 2 This represents a triumph for the G20/OECD and is incongruent with the generally held view that the US will never adopt BEPS.
The House Bill (TRA17H)
TRA17H has three BEPS related provisions: A tax on past offshore accumulations, a tax on future offshore accumulations, and a tax on base erosion payments to related parties. a. Past Accumulations. TRA17H, section 4004, imposes a 14% tax on past accumulations of cash or cash equivalents, and 7% on illiquid assets, payable over eight years.
The accumulation of offshore profits by US multinationals in low tax jurisdictions has been the focus of significant concern and a primary driver of the BEPS effort. The EU ATAD and State Aid as well as the UK Diverted Profits Tax (DPT) and current discussion on the digital economy all reflect these concerns. The imposition of US tax on past profits is insufficient, because there is no policy rationale for not taxing these profits in full (since they have been earned, there is no competitiveness or neutrality argument). But given that most MNEs do not have a tax reserve for such payments on permanently invested income and their lobbying clout, this is the best that could be expected. The rate is similar to the proposed rate under President Obama and much higher that what the EU Commission has demanded from Apple in the State Aid context (Apple Ireland has $230 billion, so 7% is $16.1 billion, and since some of it is in cash the amount will be higher, while the EU demands $13 billion). This is likely to moot the EU State Aid cases. 3 2 For my overall view on TRA17H see Avi--Yonah, Reuven S. and Fishbien, Nir, Once More, with Feeling: The 'Tax Cuts and Jobs' Act and the Original Intent of Subpart F (November 20, 2017) . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3074647; for TRA17S see Avi--Yonah, Reuven S., Guilty as Charged: Reflections on TRA17 (November 25, 2017) . Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3077342. 3 For the Obama proposal see Avi--Yonah, Reuven S., All or Nothing? The Obama Budget Proposals and BEPS (February 16, 2015 This provision has several flaws. First, obviously 10% is better than 20% (the rate on domestic US income), and given the availability of the dividend exemption, there would be an incentive to shift profits in the knowledge that they can be repatriated at any time. Second, current foreign tax credits are available to offset the 10% tax, although only for 80% of foreign taxes paid. The effect will be to have no US tax due as long as the foreign tax rate is 12.5% (so that the foreign tax credit offsets 80% of 12.5%, or 10%), which is not coincidentally the official Irish rate, even if the trigger rate is zero (because there are no tangible assets offshore). Third, the trigger rate will shield some multinationals more than others. Ironically, the more tangible assets you have offshore, the higher your trigger rate, so companies like GE that actually make things offshore will do much better than companies like Microsoft, Google or Amazon. This will be an inducement to move jobs (not just profits) offshore. In addition, TRA17H section 4301 will have another perverse effect--it will induce inversions. If a company successfully inverts, it will not be subject to the foreign high return inclusion, and will be able enjoy zero tax on those like under current law, as opposed to up to 10%. But it cannot be denied that this provision is a significant improvement over current law. Under current law the effective foreign tax rate of many US MNEs is close to zero. While this will still be true for some tangible intensive MNEs, the main BEPS culprits (Apple, Amazon, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Uber) will face a tax of 10% (since their trigger rate is zero), few foreign tax credits, and no possibility of inverting since most of them are controlled by founders subject to the shareholder level tax (Bill Gates, Sergei Brin, Larry Page, Mark Zuckerberg et al. will never agree to pay tax on their unrealized appreciation The other major inbound provisions are a limit on interest expense that does not allow the US subsidiary to be leveraged more than 10% over the leverage of its worldwide group (section 4302) (this is also in TRA17S) and a new excise tax of 20% on deductible payments other than interest paid by a US corporation to a related foreign corporation (section 4303). The excise tax can be avoided if the related foreign corporation chooses to treat the payments as ECI subject to 20% tax. The excise tax is sure to initially enrage our treaty partners, who will see it as an indirect way to impose a withholding tax on royalties (contrary to article 12 of the tax treaties) as well as violating the arm's length standard of article 9 (because the excise tax applies to cost of goods sold between related parties, implying that it is inflated, regardless of what unrelated parties would have agreed upon). It may also be subject to a WTO challenge, although less than the TRA17S provisions discussed below. But it is definitely consistent with the spirit of BEPS, and eventually may be accepted and even copied by the EU and other countries. 4 The main problem with the excise tax is that it only applies to deductible payments to related parties. An inverted multinational can sell as much as it wants directly to US customers or to unrelated US distributors and it will avoid the excise tax. But not all multinationals can invert, and this limit on the excise tax is similar to the UK and Australian DPTs, which also depend on the presence of domestic related parties. 
a. Past Accumulations
TRA17S taxes past accumulations at 14.5% (cash) and 7.5% (non--cash). This is even better than TRA17H and may be further improved in conference, as more revenue may be needed to fund other compromises (e.g., reinstating the deduction for state and local taxes to appease GOP representatives from high tax states).
b. Future Accumulations
For future Global Intangible Low Tax Income (GILTI), TRA17S provides that a U.S. shareholder of any CFC must include in gross income for a taxable year its GILTI in a manner generally similar to inclusions of subpart F income. GILTI means, with respect to any U.S. shareholder for the shareholder's taxable year, the excess (if any) of the shareholder's net "CFC tested income" over the shareholder's "net deemed tangible income return." The shareholder's "net deemed tangible income return" is an amount equal to 10 percent of the aggregate of the shareholder's pro rata share of the qualified business asset investment ("QBAI") of each CFC with respect to which it is a U.S. shareholder. "Net CFC tested income" means, with respect to any U.S. shareholder, the excess of the aggregate of its pro rata share of the tested income of each CFC over the aggregate of its pro rata share of the tested loss of each CFC. The tested income of a CFC means the excess of the gross income of the corporation determined without regard to certain exceptions (including the current active finance exception and the CFC look--through rule) over deductions (including taxes) properly allocable to such gross income. QBAI means, with respect to any CFC for a taxable year, the average of the aggregate of its adjusted bases, determined as of the close of each quarter of the taxable year, in specified tangible property used in the production of tested income in its trade or business and of a type with respect to which a deduction is generally allowable under section 167. The tax rate of future GILTI is determined by taking the US tax rate (20%) and allowing a deduction of 50%, or 10%, for a net rate of 10%. This rate can be partially offset by foreign tax credits, but in a separate basket (but with cross--averaging within the basket). The proposal is effective for taxable years of foreign corporations beginning after December 31, 2017. What this means in plain English is that Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, Netflix, and their ilk will have to pay tax at 10% on future GILTI because they have CFCs that produce "tested income" (and no loss) in excess of 10% over their basis in offshore tangible assets, which is zero or close to it (since they derive almost all of their income from intangibles).
Other MNEs (e.g., GE or Intel) will pay less because they have more tangible assets offshore. This creates an obvious incentive to move jobs (not just profits) offshore. In addition, the proposal standing on its own would also induce profit shifting because of the combination of the participation exemption and the lower rate (10% is less than 20%). To address these issues (which plague TRA17H), TRA17S proposes to apply a reduced rate of 12.5% to domestic GILTI derived from exports related to intangibles. Domestic GILTI is eligible for the 12.5% rate is "foreign derived intangible income," which is defined as the amount which bears the same ratio to the corporation's "deemed intangible income" as its "foreign--derived deduction eligible income" bears to its "deduction eligible income." Deemed intangible income is the excess of a domestic corporation's deduction eligible income (gross income without regard to subpart F income, GILTI, and other enumerated categories) over its deemed tangible income return (10% of its QBAI).
The "foreign--derived deduction eligible income" is defined as income derived in connection with (1) property that is sold by the taxpayer to any foreign person for a foreign use or (2) services to any foreign person or with respect to foreign property. In other words, this category comprises exports for property and services, although not royalty income received from foreigners. Deduction eligible income is essentially the domestic corporation's modified gross income calculated without regard to subpart F and GILTI (as well as a few other enumerated categories). So a U.S. company's foreign derived intangible income, which gets the 12.5% rate, is the amount that bears the same ratio to the deemed intangible income as the U.S. company's exports bear to its modified gross income. This "remedy" may be effective in partially addressing the shifting problem (although 12.5% is higher than 10%), but the domestic GILTI provision has an obvious WTO problem: It is a subsidy contingent on export performance, which is explicitly banned by the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) agreement. This was precisely the type of export subsidy struck down in the FSC and ETI cases, resulting in massive potential sanctions and forcing the US to repeal the subsidy and enact the ineffective and scheduled for repeal domestic manufacturing subsidy (section 199). I would expect that this provision will be struck down by the WTO, and the US will be left with only the foreign GILTI provision. As stated above, the foreign GILTI provision is inadequate, but this can be fixed by a future Democratic administration by setting the GILTI rate as the same as the domestic rate (20%). c. Base Erosion
